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R&D in China and the Implications for Industrial Restructuring

Abstract: The nation-wide introduction of foreign technology in China has been going on
for over 20 years. This paper examines the R&D incentive of the Chinese innovators by
analyzing the patent data for the period from 1985 to 1999. The following findings were
obtained. First, individual innovators, as opposed to industrial enterprises and research
institutes, have been supplying over 70% of all patent applications filed domestically.
Second, innovators in China, including the industrial enterprises, have been devoting
their R&D resources disproportionately to small innovations, rather than major ones.
Third, the large and medium-sized enterprises are not yet the main force for innovation in
China. The impacts of industrial structure on R&D incentive are emphasized. Regression
analysis for 37 manufacturing industries in China shows that R&D output, measured by
the number of patents per firm, is positively related to the eight-firm concentration ratio.
I also analyze the microeconomic channels through which the vertical structure of an
industry affects firm incentive to absorb imported technologies. “Excessive competition”
and a low degree of vertical integration in Chinese industries are major factors leading to
small-scale innovation, high propensity to purchase foreign technologies, and low
propensity to absorb them. Establishing enterprise groups that are truly subject to market
discipline can speed up the “imitation-first-and-then-innovate” process.

Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: O31
Keywords: R&D, patent, industrial concentration, vertical integration

Proposed Running Head: R&D in China
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1. Introduction
The Chinese government launched a nation-wide drive toward introducing foreign
technology on a vast scale over 20 years ago, in the hope that Chinese firms, after
absorbing the imported technologies, would eventually be able to innovate on their own
and compete with firms from developed countries. How successful has China’s “marketfor-technology” policy been? How willing have Chinese enterprises been to imitate
advanced foreign products and technologies? How willing and effective have they been
in the area of inventing new products and technologies on their own?

This paper aims to provide a systematic analysis of innovation activity in China since its
first patent law came into force in 1985. It investigates the extent to which Chinese
innovators are willing to spend resources to conduct R&D activity, identifies major
obstacles that have hindered Chinese enterprises’ incentive to innovate, and examines the
implications of the findings for further economic restructuring in China, particularly
when it is preparing for its accession to the WTO.

After a very brief description of China’s patent system in the next section, section 3 of
the paper analyzes the types of the innovations that China’s innovators have carried out
during the 1990s. Using the data on domestic patent applications and approvals published
by the Chinese government, I found the following patterns. In terms of the type of patents
applied for, over 80% of the domestic applications were for small innovations (those
generating utility models and external designs) and less than 20% were for major
innovations (those leading to patents for invention). In terms of the type of innovators,
over 70% of the domestic patent applications were filed by individual innovators, while
the rest by industrial enterprises and research institutes and universities. Among the
patents granted during the 1990s, over 60% went to individual innovators. Perhaps more
striking is the fact that the above patterns have remained quite steady during the whole of
the 1990s.

As for the large and medium-sized enterprises (LMEs), which are supposedly the main
force for innovation in China, at least so the government hopes, there is no evidence that
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they have reasonably strong incentive for innovation. As shown in section 4, the LMEs
as a whole spent less than 0.5% of their annual revenues on R&D throughout the 1990s.
Not surprisingly, the R&D output of the LMEs has also been low. During the entire year
of 1999, for example, only one in every three LMEs in China submitted a patent
application, and only one in every four was granted one. These figures for 1996 to 1998
were even lower: one in every four for patent application and one in every five for patent
granting.

Section 5 of the paper focuses on the structural factors, such as the degree of industry
concentration and vertical integration, that might have hindered Chinese firms’ incentive
to innovate. Regression results for 37 Chinese manufacturing sectors show a positive
relationship between R&D output and eight-firm industry concentration ratio. Therefore,
firms in more concentrated industries tend to be more productive at patented innovation.
This finding is consistent with the Schumpeterian view that a high level of market
concentration facilitates R&D activity. In a recent study, Jefferson et al. (2001) also
found that the level of R&D effort of the large and medium-sized enterprises in China is
positively related to the degree of industry concentration.1 This empirical relationship,
together with the fact that there has been “excessive competition” in most Chinese
industries, helps explain the observed low R&D intensity in China. A policy implication
of this finding is that increasing the degree of industry concentration can promote
innovation activity in China.

Section 5 of the paper also emphasizes the impacts of vertical aspects of industrial
structure on innovation. This vertical perspective is unique and crucial to China’s longtime drive for its enterprises to first absorb foreign technologies and then innovate on
their own. The key point of departure is the fact that absorbing imported technologies
necessarily involves learning about the consisting parts and subsystems. It is difficult, for
example, for a producer of a final product to fully understand the design and functions of
the intermediate goods it uses to make the good, unless it itself manufactures these

1

Jefferson et al. (2001) was based on a panel data set of approximately 20,000 large and medium-sized
Chinese enterprises for the period of 1995-1999 and used one-firm and two-firm concentration ratios.
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intermediate goods as well. Increased vertical integration can promote learning of
imported technologies in two important ways. First, integrated enterprises are better
equipped with the technical personnel and capability for digesting and absorbing foreign
technologies. Second, and more importantly, successful learning of foreign technology by
an individual firm often greatly benefits its upstream suppliers and/or downstream
customers. Therefore, there is a tendency for “under-investment” in learning as the firm
may not be able to fully appropriate the economic benefits of its effort in learning.
Vertical integration can help internalize the positive externality among these learning
activities and thus promote learning of imported technologies. In section 5, I make the
arguments in detail and provide evidence to support them.

Scholars have made numerous studies of why Chinese firms have invested so little in
R&D (see, for example, Shang and Shi (2000) and Ho et al. (1996) for detailed studies of
R&D in China).2 Various policy suggestions have been made for enhancing R&D
incentive in China. Most of the attention, however, has been centered on such measures
as direct government subsidy, tax credit for private R&D activity and new product sales,
improving the enforcement of intellectual property right laws, and so on. Little attention
has been paid on how to restructure China’s industries so as to make them more
conductive to innovation by private firms. Stimulated by the classical Schumpeterian
view and the experiences of the South Korean Chaebols, there have been discussions in
recent years among Chinese scholars about the roles of large enterprise groups in
promoting technological progress. These discussions have basically stayed at the level of
the “deep pocket” argument of Schumpeter. The analysis of R&D incentive and industry
structure in this paper goes beyond the general discussion to the microeconomic level and
focuses on the channels that facilitate learning and absorbing imported technology. It is
the author’s belief that restructuring the Chinese industries in relation to horizontal and
vertical concentration is a more effective way to promote R&D in China compared to
non-structural measures.

2

Shang and Shi (2001) contains careful data analysis and various policy suggestions on how to promote
R&D in China, while Ho et al. (1996) is an excellent positive study of technology transfer to and diffusion
in China.
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There have also been a few empirical studies of innovation in China in recent years.
Jefferson et al. (2001) examined a panel data set of large and medium-sized enterprises in
China for the period of 1995-1999. These authors studied the impacts of industry
concentration, firm ownership, and capital intensity on R&D incentives of Chinese
enterprises. While their findings on the relationship of R&D incentive and industrial
concentration are similar to those of my paper, their approach differs from mine in two
ways. First, the authors did not look at the composition of patent applications and
innovators, as I do in this paper. Second, they are not concerned with the vertical aspects
of industry structure. There are also other studies focusing on various aspects of R&D in
China. For example, Sun (2000) and Liu and White (2001) both study the impacts of
regional variables on innovation activity in China, whereas Hu (2001) examines the
relationship between R&D and productivity growth in Chinese industries.

2. A short history of legal protection of innovation in China
In less than 20 years, China has made tremendous progress in establishing a legal system
for the protection of innovations. China’s first patent law and its implementing
regulations were enacted in 1984 and came into effect in 1985. The patent law has been
amended twice since. The first revision, undertaken in 1992, extended the patent length
from 15 years to 20 years for invention patents and from 5 to 10 years for patents for
utility models and external designs. The second revision, which was completed in
September 2000, eliminated the provisions under the old law that prevented state-owned
enterprises from trading their patents in technology markets. The second revision also
introduced new provisions designed to make it more rewarding for enterprises’
employees to innovate. Since the passage of the 1984 patent law, the central government
has issued over 20 regulations and guidelines so as to promote innovation activity in
China. Today’s patent law in China is pretty much in line with the international standard.
Up till now, China has acceded to all the international patent treaties and its laws on
intellectual property rights meet the requirements of the WTO’s agreement on trade
related intellectual property rights (TRIPs).
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China has put in place a fairly effective system for enforcement of the intellectual
property right laws. China has adopted two procedural systems: judicially through the
courts system and administratively through the relevant administrative authorities at the
central, city, provincial, and county levels throughout the country. Intellectual property
divisions have been established in the court of law in many major cities. Enforcement of
the patent law, in particular, has been greatly improved in China since the early 1990s
due to both the internal interest of China and external pressures from its major trading
partners, such as the United States.3

R&D expenditure in China
Although still relatively low, the ratio of R&D expenditure to GDP in China has been
growing steadily in the 1990s, as shown in Table 1 below. The figures include both
private and government investments in R&D. In relative terms, R&D expenditure
reached the lowest level in 1994, amounting to only 0.475% of China’s GDP in that year.
After 1994, however, the ratio has been growing at quite an impressive rate.

Table 1: R&D Expenditure in China (in 100 million RMB at current prices)

R&D expenditure
R&D/GDP

1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
142.3
169
196
222
349 404.7 481.9 551.1
679
0.66% 0.63% 0.57% 0.48% 0.60% 0.60% 0.64% 0.69% 0.83%

Sources: China’s Statistic Yearbooks.

China’s success at establishing a modern patent protection system is naturally reflected
by R&D output. Figure 1 shows the total numbers of patent applications filed by both
domestic and foreign inventors from 1985 to 1998. In 1985, a total of 14,372 applications
were filed. The number reached 121,989 in 1998, having increased at an average annual
rate of 17.88%. The annual growth rate of the total number of patent applications is
19.58% for domestic patents and 13.51% for foreign patents. The rapid growth in the
number of patent applications can be attributed to several factors. First, China’s first
revision of its patent law in 1992 substantially extended the protection period, as
3

See Lin (2001) for a detailed description and analysis of the patent system in China.
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mentioned in the previous section. Second, since the early 1990s, China has greatly
improved its enforcement of the laws on intellectual property rights.4 Third, a massive
inflow of foreign direct investment to China, especially after Dong Xiao Ping’s “South
Tour” in 1993, has led to an increasing demand on the part of foreign investors to register
patents before they enter China’s market. As can be seen in Figure 1, the number of
patent applications filed from overseas was 5,347 in 1992, but rose to 25,756 in 1998,
having grown at an average annual rate of 29.96% during that period.

Figure 1. Patent Applications in China (1985-1998)
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Source: China Patents & Trademarks, No. 2, 1998
Note: The domestic patent data for 1997 and 1998 included patents filed by Hong Kong.

3. Types of Innovations and Types of Innovators
In this section, I will examine in detail the compositions of the types of patents filed by
domestic innovators in China and the types of these inventors. A study of such
4

Another contributing factor is China’s entry into the Patent Cooperation Treaty in 1994, which further
facilitates overseas patent applications in China.
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compositions and their evolutions over time can enhance one’s understanding of the
features of the innovation activities undertaken by Chinese inventors.
3.1 The Types of Innovations Undertaken
The current patent law of China divides patents into three categories: inventions, utility
models, and external designs. The term of protection is 20 years for invention patents and
10 years for utility model patents and external design patents. Invention patents are
regarded as major innovations. To obtain a patent for invention, an application must meet
the requirements of “novelty, inventiveness, and practical applicability.” The applications
for patents for utility models or designs, on the other hand, need only to pass an “initial
examination” wherein the patent office simply checks for the completeness of the files
and makes sure the same object has not been patented before.5

Figure 2 shows the distribution of applications for the three types of patents filed from
1986 to 1998. A striking observation is that the applications for major innovations
(invention patents) accounted for less than 20% of the total number of domestic patent
applications and were declining throughout the period, dropping to only 14.3% in 1998.
The applications for utility model patents accounted for nearly 60% of the total from
1986 to 1998, although there was a decline in relative terms in recent years. Applications
for external designs have kept increasing, representing over 30% of the total applications
in 1998. Overall, one is led to conclude that Chinese innovators have devoted most of
their R&D resources to small R&D projects that generate minor innovations such as
utility models and external designs. One cannot help notice the very low and declining
percentage of major innovations since 1994.

5

The patents for utility models and external designs under the Chinese patent system are different from
utility patents and design patents in US patent law, both of which are for major innovations in the US
system. The distinction of patent types (major versus minor innovations) in the Chinese system is similar to
that in the patent law of Hong Kong or Australia where patents are divided into standard patents (with 20
years of protection) and short-term patents (with 8 years of protection). The short-term patents are designed
to protect those innovations that do not meet the threshold requirements of a standard patent.
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Figure 2: Types of Domestic Patent Applications in
China: 1986-1998
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Source: China’s Statistic Yearbook for Science and Technology, various years.

3.2. Types of Innovators
Under the current Chinese system, applicants for patents are divided into three basic
categories: industrial enterprises, university and research institutions, and individuals.
Industrial enterprises (IEs) devote resources to their R&D activity in order to come up
with new products or new technologies. The inventions of the IEs, if patented, belong to
the enterprises that discovered them. Usually, the output of the R&D activity by
industrial enterprises can be readily used for production and leads to immediate
commercial benefits to the innovators. The second category of innovators in China is
universities and R&D institutes (URIs), which are mostly funded by the central or
provincial governments, although funding from contracting with industrial enterprises has
been increasing in recent years. These institutions employ well-trained scientists and
engineers to conduct basic and applied research. The R&D output of the URIs can be of
either academic or commercial value. The third category of inventors contains individuals
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who use their own resources to engage in innovative activity. If successful, they can file,
as they do almost all the time, for patent protection for their discoveries. These patents
are termed non-service patents under the current patent system in China, reflecting that
they are obtained through the sole effort of the individuals, rather than of their employers.
(Patents belonging to the first two categories of inventors are called service-patents.) To
exploit their discoveries’ commercial uses, the individual inventors need to either sell
their patents to commercial users or develop these inventions by setting up their own
business.

Figure 3: Distribution of Types of Inventors
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20.00%
10.00%
0.00%
1991

1992

1993

1994

IEs

URIs

1995

1996

1997

1998

Non-service

Source: same as Figure 2

Figure 3 depicts the shares of patents filed during the period of 1991 to 1998 by each of
the three types of inventors in China. As can be seen, the primary suppliers of patents in
China in the 1990s were the non-service inventors who provided nearly 70% of the patent
applications filed for every year during that period. The industrial enterprises, which the
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Chinese government has been hoping would become the main force of innovation in
China, contributed less than 15% of the total patent applications before the mid-1990s
and less than 30% afterwards. Although the share of industrial enterprises increased after
the 1995, this change, however, was mostly due to the decline in the contribution of the
university and research institutions, rather than that of the non-service inventors.6
Individual inventors were consistently the main forces of innovation in China in the
1990s; at least in terms of the number of patent applications filed. 7

Figure 4: Distribution of Patents Granted by Types of
Inventors
80.0%
70.0%
60.0%
50.0%

URIs
IEs
Non-service

40.0%
30.0%
20.0%
10.0%
0.0%
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998

In terms of patents granted, non-service inventors still remained the main suppliers of
patents in the 1990s. In particular, about 60% of approved patents went to the non-service
innovators throughout the 1990s. Industrial enterprises and university and research
institutes each received around 20% of the total number of patents granted.
6

A plausible explanation for the increasing share of the IEs and the decreasing share of the URIs after the
mid-1990s is the Chinese government’s effort in recent years to encourage research institutes to merge with
industrial enterprises. This explanation also applies to Figure 4 and Figure 5 below.
7
Note that service inventors (such as business firms) may choose not to file patent applications for their
discovery for reasons such as their desire not to reveal technical details to their competitors. Non-service
inventors do not seem to have such a motivation. The propensity to file patents is higher for non-service
inventors as they usually do not have the capacity to commercialize their inventions by themselves.
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The information revealed by Figures 2, 3, and 4 is summarized below.

Observation 1:
•

More than 80% of the domestic patent applications filed were for small
innovations (utility models and external designs) since the passage of China’s
patent law in 1985.

•

About 70% of the domestic patent applications filed in the entire 1990s came from
individual innovators.

•

Over 60% of the patents granted domestically went to individual innovators.

•

The above patterns have been rather steady over time.

From a consideration of the above patterns, one might be tempted to think that the
dominant position of the individual inventors may just reflect the low quality of R&D
projects undertaken by these individual inventors. This, however, is not necessarily the
case.

Figure 5: Invention Patent Applications
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Source: Same as Figure 2

As Figure 5 shows, individual inventors supplied over 60% of the patent applications for
invention patents (major innovations) throughout the 1990s. The relative contribution of
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the IEs, although increasing after 1995, was consistently below 20%. Although not
presented here, the compositions of patent applications for utility models and external
designs show a similar pattern, with the share of non-service inventors being over 50%
and 70%, respectively, remaining stable throughout the 1990s. In other words, individual
innovators are as dominant in producing major inventions as they are in supplying the
three types of patents as a whole.8

3.3 Composition of R&D Projects by IEs, URIs, and Non-service Innovators
To depict a clearer picture of the R&D portfolios of Chinese innovators, we next look at
the types of patent applications filed by each category of innovator. Figures 6.1 to 6.3
show the type of distributions of the patent applications filed by the three innovator
groups, respectively. On the whole, both the industrial enterprises and the individual
inventors have devoted disproportionately more resources to small projects in the 1990s.
In particular, over 80% the patent applications filed by the IEs were for utility models and
external designs. The share of invention patents for the IEs was above 10% before 1995
but declined to less than 10% afterwards. For the individual inventors, the share of
invention patent applications was persistently below 20% throughout the 1990s. The
patents applications filed by the URIs, not surprisingly, were of higher quality than those
of the other two groups, with the share of invention patents being below 30% before 1995
and then increasing to about 45% by 1998.

Figure 6.1 Types of Patent Applications
by Industrial Enterprises
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Of course, the number of patents is a crude measure of R&D productivity as it does not fully reflect the
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Figure 6.2: Types of Non-service Patent
Applications
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Figrue 6.3: Types of Patent Applications by
URIs
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The patterns in the above figures can be summarized as follows:
Observation 2:
•

Both the industrial enterprises and the non-service innovators have devoted most
of their R&D resources to small projects. Only less than 10% of the patent
applications filed by the IEs and less than 15% of the applications filed by the
non-service innovators were for major R&D projects.

•

The above patterns have been rather stable during the 1990s.

commercial value of the patents.
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3.4. Small-scale innovative activities in China?
Observations 1 and 2 reveal the following patterns of today’s Chinese innovation system.
First, the system is to a great extent individual-based, as opposed to enterprise-based like
those in developed countries.9 Second, Chinese innovators, including industrial
enterprises, invest a disproportionate amount of their R&D resources in small projects
(utility models and external designs). The industrial enterprises are far from becoming the
main force of innovation in China.

One problem with an individual-based system is that there are difficulties in realizing the
commerce value of the patents of individual inventors. First, due to their limited R&D
resources, discoveries of non-service innovators often cannot be directly commercialized.
Re-test or redesign may be needed before these patented products or processes can be put
to commercial use. This lack of marketability of patents discourages potential users from
investing in these patented items. Second, the non-service patent holders must overcome
the “matching problem” in finding the right partners. They may not have the resources
needed to search a large pool of potential users. Also, they may face opportunistic
behaviors on the part of potential users during the search process. Given that non-service
patents are often not technically sophisticated, a potential user may “invent” a similar
item on his own after learning about the patent during the negotiation process with the
patent holder. This may lead the patent holder to unwillingly accept an unfavorable deal
from a user rather than searching for the next one.

Third, there is always an informational problem in transactions involving patents. A
patent holder usually possesses more information about the quality and workability of his
patent, while the potential buyer may not be as convinced as the patent holder about the
rate of return from investing on this patented item. This problem of asymmetric
information becomes more severe when the patent “seller” is an individual rather than an
institution. First, inventions by an individual may be perceived to be low quality. Also, an
individual patent holder may simply physically disappear after receiving initial payments

9

For example, the ratio of patents granted to companies to that granted to individuals in the United States
was about 2.8:1 during the 1980s. See The U.S. Science & Engineering Indicators – 1993.
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and thus cannot be held responsible if the patent turns out to be of low value. Because of
this, many potential commercial users in China prefer to deal with institutional rather
than non-service patent holders.10 Even if a potential user is willing to invest in the
patent, he may have difficulty acquiring bank loans – banks may perceive investing in a
non-service patent as a risky project.

The potential difficulties in realizing the commercial value of a non-service patent can be
seen from the transaction activities in China’s domestic technological market, which was
incepted in the mid-1980s.

Table 2 Number of Transactions in China’s Technology Markets
Total number of deals
Sold by non-service inventors
As % of the total

1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
208098 226470 245967 222356 221182 226962 250496 281782
7588
7850
7962
11593
7309
7656
8866
9512
4%
3%
3%
5%
3%
3%
4%
3%

Source: China’s Statistic Yearbooks

Table 3 Value of Transactions in China’s Technology Markets (in 10,000 RMB)
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
Total values
948063 1416182 2075540 2288696 2683447 3002045
Sold by non-service 13902
18544
40098
43037
52220
69941
As % of the total
1.5%
1.3%
1.9%
1.9%
1.9%
2.3%

1997
1998
3513718 4358228
64060
84851
1.8%
1.9%

Source: China’s Statistic Yearbooks

The above two tables show that only a very tiny portion of the patents filed and obtained
by non-service innovators in China has been successfully exploited for commercial use in
the 1990s. Only about 3% of the technology transactions were sold by individuals and
partners, which accounted for less than 2% of the value of transactions throughout the
decade. Therefore, although non-service innovators contribute a lot to China’s innovation

10

When dealing with individual patent holders, potential users often require letters from the employer of
the innovator providing supporting information to the marketability of the patent. Due to legal
considerations, these employers are often reluctant to provide such certification letters to patents not owned
by them.
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activity in terms of the number of patents applied for and granted, most of their patents
still remain shelved and thus have not been able to realize their commercial value.

4. R&D by Large and Medium-Sized Enterprises (LMEs)

In 1999, there were a total of 22,276 large and medium-sized enterprises in China, of
which 11,370 were state owned and 3,533 were the so-called “San Zi” enterprises
(wholly foreign owned, equity joint ventures, and contractual joint ventures between
foreign firms and Mainland Chinese firms). The rest included collectively owned and
privately owned enterprises. In terms of production activity and output, the LMEs are
undoubtedly the main force of today’s Chinese economy, as indeed they should be. The
R&D performances of these LMEs, however, are perhaps not as impressive as one would
expect. Table 4 below contains information regarding innovation activity of the LMEs
during the 1990s.

Table 4 Innovation by the LMEs in China
1991 1992 1993 1994
Number of LMEs
14935 16991 15000 20162
with tech-institutes
7899 8576 9503 8817
R&D expenditures / Sales revenue
0.49% 0.50% 0.50% 0.51%
New products / Sales revenue
9.9% 10.5% 10.7% 10.2%
Number of patent applications
Applications per firm
Number of patents granted
Grants per firm
R&D expenditures*
58.6 76.1 95.2
122
Expenses on buying foreign technology*
90.2 116.1 159.2 266.7
R&D : Buying Technology
0.65 0.66 0.60 0.46

1995
23026
9165
0.46%
8.50%
141.7
360.9
0.39

1996
24061
8179
0.30%
10.0%
4936
0.205
3085
0.128
100.5
322.1
0.31

1997
24024
7313
0.52%
10.0%
5896
0.245
3032
0.126
188.3
236.5
0.80

1998
23577
7220
0.53%
11.7%
6317
0.268
4208
0.178
197.1
412.4
0.48

* In 10 million RMB
Source: China’s Statistic Yearbooks for Science and Technology, 1995-2000.
The data for purchasing technology for the years from 1991 to 1995 are from Feng (2000), p. 216.

While the number of LMEs grew fairly fast during the period, the number of LMEs that
had their own research institutes actually declined, especially after 1995.11 In 1998, only

11

This decline was likely due to the reorganization and consolidation of SOEs initiated by the central
government in the mid-1990s. While the number of LMEs was growing, certain existing firms (including
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1999
22276
7120
0.60%
13.2%
7884
0.354
5879
0.264
249.9
207.6
1.2

30.6% of the LMEs had their own research institutes. In terms of R&D intensity, the
LMEs spent just about half a percent of their annual revenues on R&D activities
throughout the 1990s, except in the year 1999.

Given these low levels of R&D input, it is not surprising that the R&D output of the
LMEs was also low. In particular, in 1996 the number of patents applied for per firm (for
all three types of patents) was only 0.21, and the number of patents granted per firm was
only 0.13. Although these two indicators improved in the years following 1996, still only
about one out of every three LMEs filed a patent during the entire year of 1999, and only
one out of every four was granted a patent in that year. One way to measure the value of
R&D output of the LMEs is to look at the ratio of new product sales to the total revenues
of the LMEs. As can be seen from the above table, only about 10% of the LMEs’
revenues were derived from new product sales from 1991 to 1997. The ratio reached
11.7% and 13.2%, respectively, for the last two years of the decade.

It has been claimed that Chinese enterprises are much more willing to purchase
technology from abroad than to innovate on their own. This claim is certainly supported
by the data shown in the above table. Specifically, in all but the last years of the 1990s,
the LMEs spent more funds buying technology from foreign countries than on their own
R&D activities. The ratio of expenditure on R&D to that on purchasing technology from
abroad was 0.65:1 in 1991. This ratio declined throughout the first half of the decade and
bottomed out at 0.31:1 in 1996 before starting to rise in 1997. The year 1999 was the first
time that the LMEs spent more on their own R&D than on purchasing foreign
technology.12

their research institutes) may have been merged with one another. In fact, the number of technical
engineering personnel employed by the LMEs increased between 1991 and 1998.
12
But the figure for 1999 might not be comparable with those for the previous years due to institutional
changes in China. In 1999, about 242 research institutes formerly pertaining to government ministries or
provinces were spun off to merge with existing enterprises, or become independent entities, as part of
China’s effort to transform its central-planning research institute system into a market-oriented one. R&D
expenditures for those research institutes were not included in the figures for the LMEs for the years prior
to 1999.
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The information on enterprises’ own R&D versus their buying technology from abroad,
along with the poor performance of R&D output in terms of patent numbers and new
product sales, is consistent with the hypothesis that, on the whole, Chinese firms are
technology buyers more than innovators.

5. R&D incentive and Industrial Structure
Commonly cited reasons for the weak R&D incentive among Chinese firms include the
lack of physical resources and technical personnel, lack of information on market
conditions, separation of research institutes and production units due to historical reasons,
and a weak intellectual property legal system. Here, I highlight the following structural
factors.

5.1 Low degree of concentration of Chinese industries
One feature of China’s industries is their low degree of concentration. Table 5 presents
information about eight-firm concentration ratios (CR8) in 37 Chinese industries in 1995.
As can be seen, none of the industries had a CR8 above 80%. In fact, only one industry
(petroleum and natural gas) had a concentration ratio above 50%, six industries had a
CR8 index between 30% and 50%, and over half of the industries had CR8 indices below
20%.13

Table 5 also contains information about R&D expenditures as a percentage of total sales
for the 37 manufacturing industries in China in the year 1995. It is striking that none of
the industries spent more that 1% of annual revenues on R&D in that year. For most of
the industries, the R&D/sales ratio was below 0.3%. Only seven of the industries had
their R&D intensity ratios above 0.5%. On the R&D output side, Table 5 lists the number
of patents applied for by and granted to the large and medium-sized enterprises in the 37
industries for the year 1996. With the exception of a few industries (coal mining,

13

Four-firm concentration ratio (CR4) is another commonly used measure of industrial concentration. I use
CR8 here because of the low degree of concentration in Chinese manufacturing industries.
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Table 5: Concentration Ratios and Patent Information for 37 Chinese Industries 1995-6

Industries
1 Coal Mining
2 Petroleum and Natural Gas
3 Ferrous Metals Mining
4 Nonferrous Metals Mining
5 Nonmetal Minerals Mining
6 Logging & Transport of Wood
7 Food Processing
8 Food Production
9 Beverage Production
10 Tobacco Processing
11 Textile
12 Garments & Fiber Products
13 Leather, Furs, & Related Product
14 Timber & Straw Products
15 Furniture Manufacturing
16 Paper Making & Paper Products
17 Printing & Record Medium Products
18 Educational and Sports Products
19 Petroleum Processing & Cooking
20 Chemical Materials & Products
21 Pharmaceutical Products
22 Chemical Fibers
23 Rubber Products
24 Plastic Products
25 Nonmetal Mineral Products
26 Ferrous Metals Processing
27 Nonferrous Metals Processing
28 Metal Products
29 Ordinary Machinery
30 Equipment for Special Purposes
31 Transportation Equipment
32 Electric Equipment & Machinery
33 Electronic & Telecom Equipment
34 Instruments & Office Machinery
35 Electric Power, Steam, & Hot Water
36 Gas Supply
37 Tap Water Production & Supply

CR8
20.3
72.36
24.5
15.9
5.9
13.5
5.3
9.9
8.6
37
2.8
3.8
2.9
5.7
5.4
5.3
5.1
8.1
44.8
11.3
11.8
37.6
18.3
3.6
2.4
30.2
13.3
4.6
6.5
6.2
20.9
8.8
14.7
7.8
39
37
24.8

Ratio 1
0.43
13.88
0.06
0.04
0.05
0.17
0.05
0.26
0.22
0.09
0.07
0.04
0.05
0.06
0.14
0.03
0.00
1.75
1.57
0.09
0.25
0.10
0.12
0.18
0.09
0.80
0.15
0.21
0.19
0.30
0.18
0.61
0.26
0.27
0.06
0.14
0.02

Ratio 2 R&D/Sales
0.27
0.10%
9.71
0.77%
0.06
0.11%
0.02
0.24%
0.01
0.36%
0.08
0.14%
0.02
0.04%
0.21
0.07%
0.17
0.13%
0.08
0.12%
0.05
0.12%
0.02
0.08%
0.06
0.15%
0.04
0.06%
0.10
0.04%
0.01
0.22%
0.00
0.09%
0.71
0.02%
0.44
0.19%
0.06
0.35%
0.17
0.77%
0.09
0.12%
0.08
0.61%
0.14
0.27%
0.06
0.28%
0.61
0.17%
0.10
0.20%
0.16
0.25%
0.12
0.62%
0.17
0.60%
0.12
0.55%
0.35
0.37%
0.12
0.38%
0.17
0.77%
0.04
0.03%
0.10
0.25%
0.01
0.19%

Source: The data on concentration ratios were computed based on China’s Statistic Yearbook 1996 and
China’s Statistics Yearbook for Large and Medium-size Enterprises 1996. Concentration ratios for the
years after 1996 are not available. The data on R&D are from China’s Third Industrial Census (1995).
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petroleum and natural gas, education and sports products, and petroleum processing
industries), LMEs in most of the other industries on average submitted fewer than 0.3
patent applications, and received fewer than 0.2 patents. Next, I will argue that a low
degree of industrial concentration is a major reason for the observed low R&D intensity
in China.

The degree of horizontal concentration is a measure of how intense competition is in a
given industry. The conventional wisdom (or the Schumpeterian view) is that industries
that are more concentrated around a few giant firms are more likely to conduct R&D
because the not-so-severe competition in the product market guarantees an attractive
return on R&D investments. Arguments in support of the Schumpeterian view also
include the following: (1) large companies have the resources needed to undertake
innovation projects (the “deep pocket” argument); (2) with large research teams, big
firms can enjoy economies of scale in knowledge production; (3) being more diversified,
larger companies are more able to absorb the risks of R&D; (4) R&D output in one
business line of a giant company can be used in other lines of its business; and (5) large
companies often have a longer time horizon, which is particularly important for
undertaking R&D projects.
Different from, but not contrary to, the Schumpeterian view is the modern view that firm
incentive to innovate depends on the types of R&D projects to be conducted. For drastic
innovations (those that can drive competitors out of business), smaller firms (or firms in
industries with a lower degree of concentration) tend to have a stronger incentive to
innovate. This is so because the lower the degree of concentration, the lower the current
profits of each firm and thus the greater the gain from innovation. On the other hand, for
incremental (or non-drastic) innovations, the larger the number of firms in the industry,
the lower the profit post-innovation, and hence the less attractive the R&D projects to a
given firm. Thus, consistent with the conventional view, for incremental innovations the
incentive to innovate is negatively related to the degree of competition in an industry.
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I believe it is safe to assume that innovations conducted by a typical Chinese enterprise
are likely to be incremental, rather than drastic, since Chinese industries are currently at
the stage of learning and imitating foreign technologies. Thus, based on the conventional
wisdom, the following hypothesis can be made:

Hypothesis: Industrial R&D incentives in China are negatively related to the degree of
competition. That is, the R&D incentives are positively related to industrial
concentration.

Using the data from the Third National Industrial Census of 1995, I conducted simple
regressions to test the above hypothesis. Below are the OLS regression results regarding
R&D output, the number of patents in particular, and industry eight-firm concentration
ratios for the 37 industries in Table 5:

Ratio 1 = 1.236327 - 0.181219(CR8) + 0.472847(CR8)^2
(5.3787)

(-8.4134)

(13.7394)

R-square = 0.9107

Ratio 2 = 0.859484 - 0.129213(CR8) + 0.332491(CR8)^2
(5.2769)

(-8.4658)

(13.6340)

R-square = 0.9074

Ratio 1: Number of patents applied for per firm in 1996
Ratio 2: Number of patents received per firm in 1996
CR8: Eight-firm concentration ratio in 1995

Therefore, both the number of patents applied for and received in 1996 were positively
related to the CR8 ratio in 1995 for the range of the CR8 observed. The one-year time lag
chosen in running the regressions is reasonable given that the approval process of patent
applications in China usually takes about a year. These preliminary results indicate that
firms in more concentrated industries tend to come up with more patents from their
innovation projects, or that they are more capable of conducting R&D. This finding is
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consistent with the Schumpeterian hypothesis.14 Using a large panel data set on large and
medium-sized Chinese enterprises, Jefferson et al. (2001) found that the R&D intensity of
the Chinese firms is positively related to the degree of industry concentration (CR1 and
CR2). These results suggest that the Schumpeterian hypothesis holds in China.15

5.2 Vertical integration
Another major factor affecting R&D incentive is the vertical aspects of an industry.
Given China’s “imitate-first-and-then-innovate” strategy towards modernizing its
technological system, the vertical structures of the industries are crucial for China. In
particular, vertical relationships among firms in an industry determine those firms’
technical ability and economic incentive for absorbing foreign technology. It also affects
the “quality” of the purchased technology.

First, learning and absorbing foreign technology and products, by means of reverse
engineering for example, is a complex process which involves various aspects and stages.
The firms concerned must have both the technical capability and the economic incentive
to engage in learning and absorbing imported technology. To comprehend the design of a
product or a process, one needs to understand the function of each component and
subsystem. An un-integrated producer of a product may not have the technical knowledge
and capability necessary to produce the intermediate goods it uses, or to replicate the
foreign-made production process using parts and subsystems supplied domestically.

Second, absorbing and imitating purchased technology or products by a domestic firm
generates economic benefits not only to itself, but also to upstream suppliers and/or
downstream users. The presence of such positive externality implies that firms may
under-invest in learning, as they are able to fully appropriate the benefits of the learning
activity. Therefore, a firm may not have a strong enough incentive to spend its resources
14

Regressions were also conducted in regard to the relationship between R&D intensity and the
concentration ratio (CR8), but the results were not significant.
15
Lunn (1986) examined the impact of market structure on the number of patents granted to firms in the
United States. He found that process patents are positively related to market concentration, which is
consistent with the Schumpeterian hypothesis. New product patents are not affected (in a statistically
significant way) by market concentration; they are more influenced, however, by industry advertising.
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to learn about foreign technology, even if it possesses the required technical capability to
do so.

Vertical integration can help solve both the above-mentioned coordination problem and
the incentive problem, thus facilitating the learning of imported technology. A vertically
integrated firm is more able to coordinate various learning activities pertaining to
different stages of production. It would not have to worry that information gained from
the various learning activities would leak to outsiders. The positive spillovers among
these activities will be more effectively internalized within the integrated firm. Thus,
giant enterprise groups tend to have a greater incentive to imitate imported technologies
and then further innovate based on the imitations.16

There is evidence to support the above arguments that vertical integration can increase
firms’ ability and incentive to absorb foreign technology. Ho et al. (1996) presented case
studies of foreign technology transfer in the textile, machinery equipment, and electronics
sectors in Jiangsu province. According to Ho et al., a common difficulty faced by the
Chinese firms in absorbing purchased technologies is that individual enterprises do not
have the ability to digest and imitate these equipment and processes because they are only
the users. In successful cases in Ho et al., domestic upstream suppliers of similar inputs
(and/or provincial research institutes) had to be involved in absorbing purchased
technology, often with local government agencies coordinating the activities.17 In a recent
survey of 967 Chinese firms by Shao (1997), enterprises were asked to list important
external factors affecting the success rate of R&D. Shao found that “support from
suppliers and/or customers” was the most-cited determinant (mentioned by 58.9% of the
firms surveyed), while 58.4% of the respondents cited “government support,” 42.8%
cited “cooperation with research institutes,” and so on. The 2000 China Industrial

16

One may argue that a firm can seek a joint effort from its suppliers in order to realize the potential
economic gains that could be derived. But given the nature of the innovative activity involved, transactions
in such a cooperation would be very high, due to the problem of “hold-up” for example, as emphasized by
Williamson (1975) and other scholars. This is particularly true given the weak intellectual property right
system in China.
17
This role of the government as a coordinator, however, has been diminishing as economic reform
continues and business enterprises become more and more independent of the governments.
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Development Report (p. 237) also reported evidence that vertically integrated firms tend
to conduct more innovative activity.

Third, the vertical structure of an industry affects to a certain extent the “quality” of the
technology purchased from abroad, which in turn affects the degree of difficulty
absorbing such technology. In particular, a vertically integrated industry tends to choose
“proper technology,” whereas a vertically separated firm has a stronger incentive to go
for “too advanced technology” which cannot easily be made compatible with
complementary inputs produced domestically. To illustrate this point clearly, suppose a
domestic firm is considering purchasing a form of technology (an assembly line) for
making cars. Should the firm choose a model that requires importation of all the
necessary auto parts? Or should it choose a “low quality model” that can make use of
some parts, say tires, supplied by domestic firms? Since importing parts squeezes out
domestic supply, the first choice imposes a cost on a domestic firm that produces tires by
itself. A vertically separated firm, on the other hand, does not face this “replacement
costs,” and, hence, is more tempted to purchase too advanced technology. This in turn
may lead to low investment in absorbing the purchased technology because the
technology is too complex for the domestic firms to learn and absorb.

Although it is hard to measure quantitatively the degree of vertical integration of an
industry, there is scattered evidence that the degree of vertical integration in Chinese
manufacturing industries is low. Consistent with this is the fact that Chinese firms have a
very weak incentive to absorb foreign technology. In 1998, for instance, the ratio of
expenditure on buying foreign technology to that on absorbing it was 14:1 for large and
medium-sized enterprises.

5.3 Availability of foreign technology and strategic consideration
One feature of today’s Chinese economy is the persistently high availability of foreign
technology ready to be imported to China, as multinational companies all try to enter the
China market. In fact, the Chinese government has on many occasions required
technological licensing as a precondition for foreign firms to enter China’s market. This

26

abundant supply of foreign technology shifts the trade off between buying technology
and innovating on one’s own in favor of the purchasing option. Relative to innovating on
one’s own, purchasing technology is less risky and returns can be realized quickly.
Because of this, a “crowding out effect” may exist in China: importing foreign
technology has “squeezed out” domestic innovation projects. The propensity to purchase
foreign technology is thus very high for Chinese firms. If all rival firms are choosing to
buy technology, it does not pay a firm to conduct its own R&D project as such projects
often take a long time to finish. A firm undertaking its own R&D project would mean a
loss of market share to rival firms in the short run. Therefore, the corresponding Nash
equilibrium is that all firms choose to buy technology. According to a recent survey of
the automobile industry, purchasing equipment was ranked as the most important channel
for obtaining advanced technology.18

5.4 Policy Implications: Encourage Consolidation of Industries
The government policies toward innovation in China have been mainly “non-structural”:
policies instruments that have been used include direct R&D subsidization, providing tax
credit for sales revenues generated from new products, setting lower limits for
expenditure on technological development and upgrading, and so on. The analysis of
R&D effort and patent data in the first half of the paper suggests that these non-structural
approaches have had only limited effects. More attention should be paid to how to design
industrial structures that are conductive to R&D. Specifically, China should increase the
level of industrial concentration, both horizontally and vertically. Increased concentration
on the horizontal level will stimulate innovation as the Schumpeterian view argues, and
as the preliminary regression analysis in this paper suggests. More integrated firms are
more capable of internalizing the positive externalities (or spill-overs) uniquely present in
the “learning-imitating-innovating” game.

A study of how to restructure Chinese enterprises and to increase industrial concentration
would be complex, and is beyond the scope of this paper. Some general arguments,
18

The survey, conducted in 1995, covered a range of 131 auto/auto part makers in China. Following the
purchasing of equipment, other means of acquiring technology include, in order of importance, exchange
with other enterprises, purchase of patents, and contract R&D. See Zhang (1998).
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however, can be presented. I am not suggesting here the use of industrial policy of any
sort. A higher degree of industrial concentration (horizontal or vertical) can be achieved
through the working of the market system. Given the current widespread low degree of
concentration in Chinese industries, many firms are operating below their efficient scales.
Thus, there should exist a demand for industrial consolidation among the Chinese firms.
Indeed, mergers and acquisitions have been happening in China, especially since the
early 1990s. As summarized in Jefferson and Rawski (2001), the mergers and
acquisitions in China fall into two categories. Market-mediated transactions aim at
commercial objectives, such as achieving economies of scale. Government-directed
restructuring, on the other hand, has been motivated by policy objectives such as limiting
social instability arising from layoffs and bankruptcies, and building large enterprise
groups that can compete successfully in global markets.

I agree with Nicolas Lard that China “ought to be relying on a much more competitive
market to drive out inefficient firms and allow some natural consolidation to take
place.”19 Industrial consolidation should not be seen as just a means by which business
firms can seek market power, or as a way by which domestic firms can prepare
themselves for the forthcoming battles with new competitors once China joins the WTO.
Better utilizing economies of scale in R&D activity is also an important driving force for
firms to merge with one another.20 The stimulating effect of increased industry
concentration on innovation should not be overlooked. As argued in Jefferson and
Rawski (2001), it is important that China should let the industrial consolidation process
proceed naturally, and not copy South Korea’s model of Chaebols. China should build up
its enterprise groups, which are truly subject to market competition rather than protected
by preferential government treatment. The role of the government should be to create, by
clearly defining property rights, by establishing a modern system of financial markets,
and by removing regional protectionism and other forms of barriers, a market
environment in which economically efficient enterprise restructuring can take place.21
19

Quoted in Restall 1997: A22.
For example, some of the recent mergers and acquisitions in the automobile industry were motivated by
R&D considerations. See Tai Guo Po, 2 February 2001.
21
See also Smyth (2000) for discussions of whether China should build up giant enterprise groups.
20
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6. The Impact of China’s Accession to the WTO on Innovation in China
It is likely that China will enter the WTO by the end of 2001. Upon its entry into the
WTO, China will follow the general principles of the WTO as well as the terms of the
bilateral agreements China has reached with major WTO member countries. China’s
accession to the WTO will have a great impact on the innovation activities of Chinese
firms due to the increased competition in the China market, removals of government
policy and regulations on technological transfers to China, and stricter enforcement of
intellectual property right laws.

The WTO’s general agreements, such as the agreement on trade related investment
measures (TRIMs) and the agreement on trade related intellectual property rights
(TRIPs), must be observed by all member countries of the WTO. Under the agreement on
TRIMs, the local content requirements that the Chinese government has often set for
foreign investment in certain industries will be removed. China can no longer require
foreign investors to set up plants for parts and subsystems for the production of final
products in China and transfer the technology accordingly. Although the laws on
intellectual property rights in China are already in line with the standards set in the
agreements on TRIPs, China’s access to the WTO will surely help improve the
enforcement of these laws, due to the existence of the intellectual property rights dispute
resolution channels of the WTO.

As foreign goods and investments will be able to enter China’s markets freely and
various forms of government protection (tariffs, quotas, subsidizes, etc.) that certain
Chinese industries have been enjoying will be removed, Chinese enterprises will face
fierce competition after China enters the WTO. Increased competition will further erode
the profitability of many already struggling Chinese firms. In the short run, Chinese
industries will become less concentrated as new firms enter. However, there have been
noticeable signs of consolidation among Chinese industries as they prepare for the shocks
of China’s accession to the WTO. For example, there has been a merger frenzy in the
automobile industry and the electronic appliance industries since early 2000 (Tai Gung
Po, 9 January 2001 and 8 February 2001). Mergers and acquisitions can help firms realize
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economies of scale in R&D activity, enabling them to more effectively absorb foreign
technology.

In addition to its effect on industrial concentration, China’s entry into the WTO will
impact innovation in the nation through its impact on technology transfers to China by
foreign firms. As impressive as it has been, China’s attraction of foreign investment and
technology in the past two decades has been to a great extent due to the Chinese
government policy and regulations that have aimed at importing advanced technology.
Various laws and regulations in China require technology transfer of foreign companies
when deciding their applications for investment in China. There have been reports over
the past several years of some foreign companies being “forced” to transfer technology to
China in exchange for access to its enormous market.22 A recent survey of some EU firms
revealed that 46% of the technology transfers to China by these EU firms were because
of the government policies and regulations requiring local sources and/or technology
transfer.23

With China’s forthcoming accession to the WTO, existing barriers on foreign
investments in China will soon be removed and technology transfers to China will be on
a voluntary basis. For example, in the bilateral agreement between China and the United
States, China agreed it would not condition foreign investment or import approvals on
technology transfer or on conducting R&D in China, and that requirements as a condition
for investment approval or importation, and the terms and conditions of any transfer of
technology, will be agreed between the parties to a contract and not imposed by the
government. China also agreed that it would eliminate requirements mandating that the
Chinese partners in a joint venture gain ownership of trade secrets after a certain number
of years.24 Local content requirement will not be permitted under the TRIMs. With the
removal of the policy requirements, Chinese enterprises will loss an important channel of
obtaining foreign technology, namely “forced technology transfer.”
22

See “U.S. Commercial Technology Transfers to the PRC,” 1999, a research report by the Bureau of
Export Administration and the Office of Strategic Industries and Economic Security of the United States.
23
See Bennett et al. (2000).
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There is, however, a bright side to China’s entry into the WTO in regard to innovation by
Chinese firms. In the past, technology transfers to China have also been either motivated
by normal business considerations, such as market expansion or responses to pressures
from rival firms. According to a survey on EU firms by Bennett et al. (2000), when asked
what were the reasons for technology transfer to China, 80% of the companies cited
market access, 57% cited cost advantage, 48% cited “company globalization strategy,”
and 33% cited responses to competitors’ moves (actual or potential). These factors will of
course remain as the main motivators of technology transfer to China. In fact, as more
and more foreign companies enter the China market and competition intensifies, foreign
investors are more likely to transfer more advanced technology to China. The enhanced
incentive for technology transfer will bring many forms of advanced technology to
China.

7. Concluding Remarks
It is a remarkable achievement that China established a modern patent system in less than
20 years. However, a patent system itself, although necessary, is not sufficient for
enterprises to be willing to undertake innovation activity. As presented in the first half of
the paper, China’s innovation activity in the past 15 years has been primarily on a small
scale, aimed at small R&D projects (utility models and external designs, as opposed to
inventions). Industrial enterprises have not yet become the main force of innovation in
China. Even when they are equipped with technology purchased from abroad, Chinese
firms must develop the capability to innovate on their own in order to compete
successfully in the world’s markets. There are yet to be any indications of this happening
persistently and on a reasonable scale in China.

Factors affecting firm incentive to invent are many. This paper has emphasized the roles
of such structural factors as the degree of industrial concentration and vertical
organizations in facilitating industrial R&D. There is empirical evidence supporting the

24

See the sector papers by the Washington Council on International Trade,
http://www/wcit.org/Chinawto_sectorpapers.htm.
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Schumpeterian hypothesis, namely that the incentive to innovate is positively related to
the degree of market concentration. I have also analyzed the microeconomic channels
through which the vertical structures of an industry induce the learning and absorbing of
imported technology. My analysis indicates that a sensible thing for China to do is to
restructure its industries both horizontally and vertically so as to create industry structures
that are more conductive to innovation. Specifically, more concentrated industrial
structures can promote innovation, and more vertically integrated enterprises can
encourage and facilitate the learning and absorbing of foreign technology.25 Industrial
restructuring in this direction can speed up the now two-decade long “imitate-first-andthen-innovate” process. Non-structural policy instruments, such as R&D subsidization
and tax credit for innovation, have perhaps already reached the limit when it comes to
stimulating R&D activity by Chinese enterprises, and the effects of industry structures on
innovation should receive more attention from policy makers in China.
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